Borrowers Strategic Loan Default in Central Bank Microfinance Facilities and Incentives to Repay
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Abstract
This study examines the incidence of strategic default by borrowers in Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) microfinance loan facilities and the role of incentives to prevent such opportunistic behaviour. A collective strategic default is a situation where sound borrower feigns inability to repay with an expectation that a large number of other borrowers will not repay their loans, thus reducing the bank’s enforcement capacity, and then the effectiveness of the policy. Such opportunistic behaviour of borrowers happens in a framework in which there is no incentives to compel and encourage borrowers to pay back the borrowed funds. Using an extensive form game in a global game theory framework, the study found that without incentives, there is a room for opportunistic behaviour in central government financial intervention programmes. While such programmes are expected to benefit the economy, but incentives, either positive or negative will reduce incidence of strategic default.
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